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The Capitalist Welfare State and its Causes: A
Response
Michael A. McCarthy

Department of Social and Cultural Sciences Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, USA

Three distinct concerns have preoccupied critical welfare state research over the past 50 years. During the
period of welfare expansion in the US, roughly dating to the second half of Carter’s presidential term, much of
the literature asked how welfare states and policies regulate poor and the working-class populations to govern
for capitalist accumulation. Researchers in this vein identified the ways that welfare policies demobilize
movements and restore legitimacy in governance (Offe, 1975; Piven and Cloward, 1971). Since the onset of
welfare state retrenchment and political austerity, such that even social democracies like Sweden have set upon
paths of liberalization, researchers have become nostalgic. This second research agenda instead concerns how
welfare states are built and in turn retrenched, often with the normative implication of reversing the latter
course. And finally, following Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) researchers have set
upon classifying welfare regimes into types, to understand the varieties of configurations that they come in.
Dismantling Solidarity enters this second and third discussion, but it draws important lessons from the first. In
precisely the period that capitalism was being unleashed, Theda Skocpol’s critiques of neo-Marxian theory were
gaining an increasing intellectual grip on the discipline of sociology and offered one avenue out for those

concerned with large historical processes (1980). State-centered theory, or what later became historical
institutionalism, produced a large literature on policy change and welfare states that deeply influenced the
scholarship in both American sociology and political science. Other turns away from political economy were also
underway, namely the cultural and linguistic shifts in the 1990s and 2000s (Somers, 1991). In the 1990s and
2000s, many other theories of the welfare state flourished, power resources theory and employer-centered
approaches chiefly among them. And though much was learned in these debates, they tended to pit monocausal approaches against each other. Much of the research ignored how capitalism itself structures and
constrains political action. As a result, capitalism faded to the background in the scholarly literature on
policymaking and the defining insight of the first wave of welfare state research in the 1970s fell from view. It
became commonplace, indeed a sign of a basic graduate education, to dismiss the earlier neo-Marxist theories
as simply too reductionist, abstract and functionalist to be of use.
Set against this conceptual landscape, Dismantling Solidarity answers a specific question about a very large
process in welfare state retrenchment: why since the establishment of the Social Security Act in 1935 and
Roosevent’s articulation of the “freedom from want” during the Second World War, was the promise of a
solidaristic, public, and egalitarian system of retirement provisioning not only unfilled but slowly eroded and
increasingly replaced with mechanisms for allocating retirement income situated in capitalist markets? To
answer this question, I found that I needed to explain three key episodes of marketization: (1) After WWII,
instead of deep expansions of the public system the US turned to private employer pensions; (2) after they were
established employer pension funds were then financialized and retirement assets were directed into the stock
market, tying workers retirement income to the turbulence of financial markets; (3) finally, the traditional
defined-benefit plans that were won after WWII went into decline and more employers turned to definedcontribution plans, which offset risk from firms onto their employees.
When I set out to make sense of each of these episodes, I did not do so intending to restore the basic insight
pressed by neo-Marxian researchers in the 1970s mentioned above. But as I was confronted with comparative
data from the business, labor and political archival records, considering how political actors made decisions in
different contexts and across different times and in turn came to understand their own action environments, it
became increasingly clear to me that, as de Leon writes, the “structural scope conditions” laid out by capitalist
accumulation and crises were far too important to relegate to the background. Yet, as Harris points out, I am not
particularly wistful about neo-Marxian state theory either. There were indeed problems of abstraction and
functionalism in these theories, problems that can only be overcome by adopting a posture of theoretical
ecumenism that was rare to find in the paradigm battles that define welfare state theory’s past. To build on the
insights of neo-Marxism, I found it crucial to afford causal weight to institutionalist processes in the conceptual
framework. What I see as my main innovation upon these theories is to argue for a more causally dynamic
account. In my view, structural factors establish a range of possible policy options to policymakers in capitalist
societies, but more contingent historical processes select from within this range.
Through a comparison of each episode of marketization, Dismantling Solidarity makes three key arguments,
which taken together casts some new light on the theory of the capitalist state and policymaking. The first I term
the state regulated marketization argument. The marketization of old age security in America was political in its
most proximate causes, in each case it was triggered by politicians and political bureaucrats. Changes occurring
in the private system of retirement provisioning were, somewhat ironically, driven by a stronger hand of the
state rather than a weaker one. Employing the notion of “trialectics,” Schwartz develops a friendly reframing of
not only this first argument, but indeed the entire conceptual approach. He suggests that at the
heart Dismantling Solidarity are three “interconnected dialectical relationships”: (1) labor versus capital, (2)
labor versus the state, and (3) capital versus the state. I don’t disagree with this characterization, but
sometimes, Schwartz suggests, I misidentify the primary cause. Focusing on the postwar adoption of private

pensions, Schwartz argues that my emphasis on politicians as the proximate cause is somewhat misplaced. In his
view, the government didn’t have the leverage to impose changes in the pension system. Instead, Schwartz
argues that in the adoption of private pensions after the Second World War, business conceded pensions in
contracts because of the strike wave and union leverage instead.
Schwartz’s alternative is certainly plausible, but I think is too weak a cause if left on its own and ultimately
unsupported by the evidence. Dismantling Solidarity does show that the postwar strike wave had significant
causal weight, even if not in precisely quite the way Schwartz suggests. And it is certainly the case that shopfloor labor power led to the adoption of some pension plans. But labor strikes were not as successful in
compelling firms to offer pensions in contracts as they were at generating worry among politicians about
capitalist growth and America’s hegemonic position in the global economy. I agree with Schwartz that the
government did not have “determinative power in implementing a negotiated settlement between capital and
labor.” But through its effort to resolve the strike wave, via plant seizures, fact-finding boards, contract
settlement recommendations, and a National Labor Relations Board decision that was upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1949, which made bargaining over pensions mandatory, the state used the power of law to force the
issue onto the table in contract negotiations.
Prior to state intervention, most firms refused to even consider collectively bargained plans. But that changed
once the state got involved. To quote the National Industrial Conference Board at the time, “The most important
event in the field of company pension plans has been the ruling of several federal agencies and courts that
pensions are a subject for collective bargaining” (cited in McCarthy, 2017: 65). Even the National Association of
Manufacturers, previously staunchly against negotiated pensions, resigned itself after the Supreme Court
refused to hear the NLRB decision, saying “mandatory bargaining is now a fact” (2017: 68). This bears out in the
data on pension adoption, when the government made proclamations to adopt these plans through fact-finding
boards it bore positively on the adoption rate in contract negotiations (2017: 69). Schwartz is certainly correct to
suggest that strikes mattered; they absolutely did. Labor unrest created a context of crisis for policymakers and
brought employers to the negotiation table. But it is hard to imagine that pension adoption would have been as
common as it was had the government not played the role it did in the history.
A question follows this first argument. If policymakers were the proximate cause, then what motivated them
intervene in the private affairs of firms in the first place? This question leads to the second argument of the
book, the managing capitalism argument. Dismantling Solidarity finds that the policymakers in this story were
not motivated to intervene because of their party affiliation (both Republicans and Democrats intervened with
similar results), their political ideology, or interest group influence over them. In fact, policymakers weren’t
primarily concerned about retirement security at all. Above all else, politicians and political actors intervened to
manage perceived crises in capitalism and to encourage capitalist accumulation for “professional selfpreservation,” as Harris rightly points out. A structural factor, the need to manage capitalism, is a recurrent
theme in the book and core motivation for politicians’ behavior.
Mudge suggests, however, that I might be engaging in something of a “conceptual sleight-of-hand” where my
own “meanings are imposed on actors who may understand themselves to mean something very different.”
Perception, meanings, and motivations are indeed thorny issues. Intuiting a historical person’s motivations and
the meanings they give to their actions, let alone someone sitting directly in front of you, is a much more
difficult task than simply identifying things that happened. And as Mark Blyth notes, “Structures do not come
with an instruction sheet,” politicians had to interpret their context and come up with solutions to the percieved
issues that they confronted (2003). This points to a parallel concern in imputing motivations to political actors.
The capitalist crises themselves need to be first perceived then interpreted by those same actors as well. While I
do less conceptual work here, as Harris recognizes, this is an issue I am aware of throughout.

So, there are two interpretive challenges bound up with one another. To understand the motivations actors
have for their own actions, we need to understand how actors make sense of their environments in the first
place. Harris is surely correct when he notes that there is a consistent, if somewhat less obvious, constructivist
dimension of the argument at work in Dismantling Solidarity. While structures set politicians into motion, it is
the analyst’s task to understand how politicians themselves understood and made sense of those structures and
their own actions as they navigate the situation.
Then what makes me think, repeating Mudge’s concern, that the meaning and motivations that political actors
had were the ones I suggest here? While any historian faces considerable difficulty in identifying a historical
subject’s motivations, Dismantling Solidarity marshals a large amount of data to do precisely this—to provide a
picture that politicians were indeed motivated to facilitate capitalist accumulation as best they could and
believed that they faced crises or the looming threat of one. Focusing primarily on Presidential Administrations, I
draw quite heavily from policymakers’ own words, in both their public proclamations and private
correspondences. The evidence suggests that politicians were indeed forward looking in their concern for
capitalist accumulation, they both responded to and attempted to anticipate future crises. Sometimes they did
this more so than capitalists themselves, as was the case in both the immediate postwar period and during the
inflation crisis of the 1970s when many businesses were quite hostile to the Volcker shocks.
Returning to the postwar adoption of private pensions, consider Truman’s words before representatives of
business and unions at the Labor-Management Conference where in the context of industrial conflict he said,
“The whole world now needs the produce of our mills and factories— everything stands ready and primed for a
great future. But situations and circumstances can change rapidly. Our unparalleled opportunity may not long
remain open. We must have production— vast production. We must have it soon” (cited in McCarthy, 2017:
62). It is entirely possible that they were driven by more subterranean concerns, but the available evidence
points, somewhat overwhelmingly in my view, to a durable political attention to capitalist growth.
Mudge also raises issues about my conceptualization of politics. Policymakers and state bureaucrats are
somewhat interchangeable and as Mudge says “undifferentiated” in my conceptual framing, while in the
empirical history I lay out the complexities of institution and one’s location in the state become more
pronounced. The implication of my theory is that the peculiar goals and orientations of political actors are
largely determined by the constellation of interests in their party, their state, their district, and so on—but even
these are structured by the capitalist context. Mudge’s argument is that once we begin to differentiate “the
political” into parties, states, Federal Reserve governors, Cabinet members, technocrats, government agencies,
presidential administrations, party politicians, and so on, we will begin to realize that each of these unique
environments generates its own peculiar constraints. I have no doubt that Mudge is right in this. How do we
understand how the variety of political action environments are informed and constrained? The way political
institutions themselves constrain political actors has long been the focus of political scientists and scholars in the
tradition of American political development. As Mudge rightly notes, my framework does not aim to do this; I
am instead painting in broader strokes about elected officials more generally.
The fundamental question is to what degree do the constraints peculiar to particular positions within the state
run counter to, or offset, the constraints imposed on governing in a capitalist society generally? This is a
methodological question I do not take up, but doing so in future work would certainly be in the spirit of Mudge’s
comments. Comparative work might aim to consider the degree to which different political actors are exposed
or shielded from the structural imperatives I discuss in the book. And how their institutional and professional
context might mediate those structural imperatives. Furthermore, how do more constructivist dimensions vary
with respect to an actor’s location in the state apparatus? For instance, do state governors perceive crises

differently than Federal Reserve Board governors? And if so, what dimensions of their institutional location
prove most salient in the construction of their views about the “national good”?
Indeed, this raises even bigger questions about the portability of this framework beyond American political
institutions. Or as Harris asks, “Do nomenklatura dream of capital strikes?” To what degree does “structural
contingency” drive political interventions in non-capitalist and less developed welfare state making and
unmaking as well? Or were the systems adopted and built in these countries “due to emulation of perceived
‘modern’ institutions touted by Western states and international organizations” as Harris suggests? While these
questions are beyond the scope of my own book, it certainly gestures toward them, and I hope scholars take
them up. Finding new processes by which political agents are shielded or exposed to capitalist imperatives both
across American political institutions and across other capitalist and non-capitalist country cases more broadly
will not invalidate my book’s basic argument about elected politicians in capitalist societies. But it could certainly
point to avenues to develop the conceptual framework and broaden the idea of structural. My own work is on
capitalist contexts. In other systems of production and exchange, we will certainly find very different forms of
structural constraint.
This raises a final set of questions that relate to the third core argument of my book—why does the state
intervene in the particular ways that it does? And, how do those interventions actually drive marketization? In
concrete terms, here I seek to explain the particular approaches that policymakers set upon to solve or avoid
capitalist crises. Dismantling Solidarity finds that how the state matters and what policymakers do is contingent
on the balance of class forces in society. This is my third argument, what I term the class forces as mediator
argument. Both the form that state intervention took and how that state intervention drove marketization
depended on the relative power of labor and capital, both in and out of formal politics. State action and the
effects of that action, quite simply, cannot be reduced to the political aim of managing capitalism. To do so
would be to slip into the functionalism we hope to avoid. This is a fundamental point, and a crucial oversight of
many of in the neo-Marxist wave of welfare state theory in the 1970s. The structure of capitalism demarcates a
range of policies available to the state to promote accumulation; class struggles select from within that range,
what I refer to as “structural contingency.”
Here, de Leon raises a critical concern about the tension between structuralism and voluntarism in Dismantling
Solidarity, putting me squarely on the structuralist side of things. I certainly put greater emphasis on structure,
but this is largely in an effort to rescue it from the past. I don’t think my analysis points to a “fear of
voluntarism” in precisely the way he suggests. I would argue that voluntarism, such as labor strategy—which
Schwartz points to as well, and structuralism do not really operate in isolation from one another. The notion of
structural contingency aims to show that there is a dialectical relationship between them. There are multiple
forms of capitalist crisis, which as Harris points out policymakers perceive and react to in different ways
depending on the context. But we can really classify these divergent crises into two types. In one, market
volatility and economic breakdowns results because of capitalism’s own internal routines, by people simply
pursuing their own interests and in doing so causing economic collapse. We can think of these forms of crisis as
collective action failures. The ecological crisis that is well underway and hich threatens our very existence can be
explained as a crisis of this sort. Yet my book points to another kind of crisis as well – one that policymakers are
just as concerned with. This second form of crisis results from intentional collective action. Forms of concerted
action such as strikes, boycotts, riots, protests, and sometimes even revolutions. This is the kind of crisis that
was so central to poor people winning demands in Piven and Cloward’s classic, Poor People’s
Movements (1977). Of course, business can do this as well, the “capital strike” being but one example.
The degree to which labor militants were able to cause political panic during the context of the Great Depression
in the 1930s and in fact deepen that depression in the short term, was a critical component of the pro-labor

reforms in the package of New Deal legislation that followed. Returning to de Leon’s concern, here we see
voluntarism and structuralism turn in on each other, such that history’s direction can’t and shouldn’t be reduced
as a cause of one or the other. Dismantling Solidarity shows that the capitalist context structurally compels
policymakers to promote capitalist growth. But sometimes labor strategy is the cause of the crisis compelling
the state to act. If that strategy is strong enough, it may result in concessions from policymakers as was the case
in the 1930s. But if it isn’t, as was the case of the wage inflation crisis of the 1970s, policymakers may intervene
to kill the source. But whether it is voluntarism or collective action failures that result from structurally informed
patterns of behavior that are driving capitalist crises is not set in stone, one must do the historical work to see.
Schwartz, Harris, Mudge and de Leon have my sincere gratitude for their informed and challenging thoughts on
my book.

References

Blyth, M (2003) Structures do not come with an instruction sheet: Interests, ideas and progress in
political science. Perspectives on Politics 1(4): 695–703.
Esping-Andersen, G (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
McCarthy, M (2017) Dismantling Solidarity; Capitalist Politics and American Pensions Since the New
Deal. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Offe, C (1975) The capitalist state and the problem of policy formation. In: Lindberg, L (ed.) Stress and
Contradiction in Contemporary Capitalism. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 125–144.
Piven, FF, Cloward, R (1971) Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. New York, NY:
Vintage.
Piven, FF, Cloward, R (1977) Poor People’s Movements: How They Succeed and Why They Fail. New
York, NY: Pantheon Books.
Skocpol, T (1980) Political response to capitalist crisis: Neo-Marxist theories of the state and the case of
the new deal. Politics and Society 10(2): 155–201.
Somers, M (1991) Narrativity, narrative identity, and social action: Rethinking English working-class
formation. Social Science History 16(4): 591–630.

